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Case No. 20150266-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JACK DANIEL BROWN,
Appellant/Petitionet,

v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee/Respondent.

Brief of A ppellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Brown appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction
relief, challenging his conviction for aggravated murder, a first degree felony.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(b)O) (West
2015).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Brown pleaded guilty to aggravated murder and was sentenced in 2008
(R74, 96-97). He did not move to withdraw his plea and did not appeal. Brown
filed his post-conviction petition in 2013 (Rl-8). The lower court dismissed the
petition as untimely (R136-38, 165-68; Addenda Band C).
1. Did the lower court correctly dismiss Brown's untimely petition?

Standard of Review: An appeal from an order dismissing a petition for
post-conviction relief is reviewed for correctness without deference to the lower
court's conclusions of law. Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85, if 6,293 P.3d 259.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules

are

reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-106 (procedural bar)
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-107 (statute of limitations)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE Brown was charged with aggravated murder, a
capital felony, aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, and obstruction of
justice, a second degree felony (R3). He pleaded guilty to aggravated murder
and was sentenced to life in prison without parole on January 25, 2008 (case no.
061500626) (R74, 96-97). 1 The other charges were dismissed (RS). Brown did
not move to withdraw his plea and did not appeal. He filed a petition for postconviction relief in 2013 (Rl-8). 2

The post-conviction court entered a

preliminary order noting that the petition appeared untimely (R27-29).

The

court gave notice that it was raising the time bar sua sponte, and gave both
Although Brown was sentenced the same day he entered his guilty plea,
the judgment was not filed until January 30, 2008 (R97).
1

Brown actually filed a motion for re-sentencing in the Utah Supreme
Court (Rl-8). That court referred the 1natter to the dish·ict court, and the motion
for re-sentencing was filed in the district court as a post-conviction petition
(case no. 130500433) (R18).
2
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parties sixty days to "bring to the Court's attention any pertinent facts or legal
arguments related to the timeliness of the petition" since a petitioner is entitled
to an opportunity to be heard and to explain why his claim is not subject to a
procedural or time bar. Id.
Brown filed an a1nended memorandum in support of his petition (R3460). The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely (R61-107).
Brown did not oppose the State's motion to dis1niss, and the district court
granted it (R136-138; Addendum B). An amended order was designated as a
final order (R165-168; Addendum C). Brown timely appealed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The dish·ict court properly dismissed the petition because it was
untimely. On appeal, Brown argues that the dish·ict court erred in dismissing
the petition because the so-called "egregious injustice exception" could have
been applied.

But the post-conviction court could not apply an "egregious

injustice" exception to the untimely petition because doing so would violate
rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which obliges district courts to apply
the PCRA as written.

Only the Supreme Court can suspend rule 65C and

recognize such an exception to the statute of limitations. In any event, Brown
has not met the threshold requirements the supreme court has identified that
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must be met before the court would even consider whether an "egregious
injustice" exception exists at all.
Brown also argues that the limitations period should be tolled because he
is mentally ill and was not on antipsychotic medication until 2013. But this
argmnent is unpreserved because it was never raised in the post-conviction
court below, and Brown fails to justify appellate review under any established
preservation rule.
Brown also claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Since
Brown fails to establish error in the lower court's time bar ruling, this Court
need not consider the merits of Brown's underlying claims.
ARGUMENT

I.
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
BROWN'S UNTIMELY PETITION

The Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) bars relief on any claim filed
more than one year after the cause of action accrues. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9106(1)(e), -107 (West 2009) (Addendum A). See also Winward v. State, 2012 UT
85, ,r12, 293 P.3d 259.
A.

The post-conviction petition was untimely because it was not
filed within one year of the last day for filing an appeal.

For petitioners like Brown who do not directly appeal, the cause of action
ordinarily accrues on "the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the
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final judgment of conviction." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(2)(a). The criminal
court entered its final judgment on January 30, 2008 (R97). Brown's time to
appeal thus expired, and his post-conviction claims accrued, on March 1, 2008.
Brown therefore had until February 28, 2009, to file a post-conviction petition.
He did not file his petition until August 8, 2013, four and one half years too
late. 3 The petition was therefore untimely.
The PCRA contains later accrual dates and a tolling provision. Because
the State raised the time bar defense, Brown bore the burden of proving that he
should be allowed to proceed with his claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-105(2).
As shown below, he failed to meet that burden. Therefore, the district court
properly dismissed the untimely petition.
B.

Brown did not prove that his cause of action accrued on a later
date that would make his petition timely.

A cause of action may also accrue - thus starting the one-year period - on
"the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based." Utah
Code Ann.§ 78B-9-107(2)(e).
Beginning on December 16, 2011, Brown began filing motions (such as a
motion for discovery and a motion for re-sentencing) in the underlying criminal
case. He then filed a motion in the Utah Supreme court on July 17, 2013 (R1).
On August 1, 2013, the Supreme Court entered an Order which referred the
1natter to the dish·ict court (R18). Brown's earlier motions do not qualify as
post-conviction petitions, but even if they did, they were all filed more than two
years beyond the PCRA's one year limitations period.
3
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Brown acknowledged that his petition was filed "after the one year
statute of limitations." (R34). But he argued that his petition should not be
dismissed because it was based on his "new found understanding of the legal
significance of the material he had already been in possession of." (R34-35).
Brown argues that his petition was timely because he did not discover his
counsel's misconduct until "more than a year later." (Aplt. Br. at 2). Although
he does not now specify what alleged misconduct he is referring to, Brown
asserted below that he received ineffective assistance because his counsel did
not tell him before pleading that he was entitled to a sentencing phase hearing
under Utah Code section 76-3-207. Brown asserts that he only became aware of
this in March, 2012. Even if this could qualify as the accrual date for Brown's
cause of action, the petition was still untimely because it was not filed until over
a year later, on August 8, 2013. 4
Brown also asserts that his counsel cmnmitted misconduct by agreeing to
pay for an out-of-state prison h·ansfer if Brown would accept a plea (Aplt. Br. at
2). If true, Brown obviously knew about this agreement before entering his
Even if the claim were timely, Brown would not be entitled to postconviction relief because the claim is meritless. Brown acknowledged that he
agreed to a sentence of life without possibility of parole. Once Brown accepted
the plea bargain and pleaded guilty, he waived his right to a penalty phase
hearing in exchange for the prosecution not seeking the death penalty. A "court
may entertain a plea bargain conditioned upon an agreement to impose a
particular sentence." State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1300 (Utah 1986).
4
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plea. But he asserts that he did not discover that this agreement was "not legal"
and was "against the rules of conduct" until "more than a year later." 5 Id.
By its plain terms, section 107(2)(e)'s new-evidence accrual date only
postpones accrual until a petitioner does or reasonably could discover
"evidentiary facts on which the petition is based." It does not postpone accrual
until the petitioner comes to understand the legal significance of those facts.
This Court recently clarified this. The "time for filing begins to run when the
petitioner knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known
the evidentiary facts and 'not when the petitioner recognizes their legal
significance."' Brown v. State, 2015 UT App 254,

il9, 361 P.3d 124 (alteration

omitted) (citing Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356 (7th Cir. 2000)).
The PCRA gives a petitioner an entire year to determine whether any of
the facts of his case could give rise to a legally supportable claim for postconviction relief.

And to the extent he is prevented from making that

Even if the claim were timely, Brown would not be entitled to postconviction relief because his own proffer shows that he cannot prove his claim.
Brown attached a copy of a letter sent to him from his counsel Mike Esplin.
That letter states: "I certainly remember our conversation about your wanting a
transfer. I also remember that both Mary and I advised you that being able to
be transferred was not a condition of your plea, and that you should make the
decision based upon the other considerations such as sh·ength of the state's
case, likelihood of being able to get a better result from a jury, and being able to
be assured of getting the death penalty off the table. I recall that your decision
was based on those factors, not the possibility of getting a transfer."
(Addendum D).
5
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determination by mental or physical incapacity, or by unconstitutional state
action, the limitations period will be tolled. Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-107(3).
The distinction between knowledge of evidentiary facts and appreciation
of their legal significance mirrors well-established federal case law applying a
similar statute of limitations in the federal habeas corpus context. Under 28
United States Code section 2244, the one-year limitation period runs from "the
date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence."

(l)(D).

28 U.S.C. §2244( d)

"Factual predicate" under the federal statute is no different than

"evidentiary facts" under the PCRA.
Under federal case law, the time "begins when the prisoner knows (or
through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner

recognizes their legal significance." Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000)
(emphasis added). If the habeas statute of limitations "used a subjective rather
than an objective standard, then there would be no effective time limit." Id.
Brown failed to establish that any new evidentiary facts made his cause
of action accrue on a later date. He therefore caimot establish that the postconviction court erred by denying the petition as untimely.
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C.

Brown failed to establish that the tolling provision should be
applied.

The PCRA states that the limitations period is tolled for any period
during which the petitioner was "prevented from filing a petition due to state
action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to physical or
mental incapacity." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(3).
The post-conviction court ruled that Brown had "not raised a colorable
argument that he was 'prevented from filing a petition due to state action in
violation of United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental
incapacity."' (R165) (citation omitted). Brown has failed to establish that this
ruling was in error.
On appeal, Brown asserts that he only became aware of the tolling
provision when it was quoted in the district court's decision to dismiss the
petition (Aplt. Br. at 3). But the State cited the tolling provision in its motion to
dismiss, which it filed and served on Brown more than six months before the
court's ruling (R69-70).

Brown did not oppose that motion.

And Brown's

unawareness of the tolling provision does not satisfy its requirements.
1.

Brown failed to establish that he was prevented from timely
filing his petition by state action.

On appeal, Brown argues that he "is reasonably justified in failing to
meet the one-year statute of limitations ... because the legal resources available
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to him as an incarcerated defendant are insufficient." (Aplt. Br. at 3). Brown
presents no other argument or discussion of this issue other than this one
sentence. Brown never raised this argument below. It is therefore unpreserved.
Utah courts have consistently held that issues not properly briefed
should not be addressed on appeal. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966
(Utah 1989). Brown not only failed to assert why or how the legal resources
available to him were insufficient, but he also acknowledges that he discussed
legal matters with the prison contract attorneys (Aplt. Br. at 3). He has failed to
show that legal resources were not available to him.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the "fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist
inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing
prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491 (1977); see

also Crawford v. Smith, 578 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1978).
Utah contracts with attorneys to meet its Bounds obligations. See, e.g.,

Carper v. Deland, 54 F.3d 613 (10th Cir. 1995). To establish a Bounds violation,
Brown would have to demonstrate that alleged shortcomings in the prison
contract attorney's assistance actually hindered his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Brown failed to

-10-

even make this assertion. The district court correctly determined that Brown
had not raised a colorable argument that he was prevented from timely filing a
petition due to state action.

2. Brown failed to establish that he was prevented from timely
filing his petition due to physical or mental incapacity.
On appeat Brown argues that the limitations period should be tolled
because he "is mentally ill and has not been on antipsychotic medication until
2013." (Aplt. Br. at 3). He asserts that it is only since being on anti-psychotic
medication that he has been able to comprehend that his counsel's actions were
illegal and has been able to discuss these legal matters with the contract
attorneys. Id. But Brown never raised this argument in the post-conviction
court below. 6 It is therefore unpreserved. Brown does not argue plain error or
any other exception to the preservation rule. And Brown fails to present any
additional information or evidence to establish that he was mentally
incapacitated, when he became incapacitated, when he began taking anti-

In his amended memorandum, Brown asserted that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his life history for mitigation
evidence. As part of that argument, he asserted that he was enrolled in special
education classes, had a learning disability, and did not graduate high school
until he obtained his diploma as an inmate. He also asserted that he had
"severe mental damages" for which he was being treated and taking medication
(R36-38). Brown argued that if his counsel had been effective, they would have
"discovered the difficulties of petitioner's developing years as a child." (R38).
But this argument related to trial counsel's mitigation investigation, not a
tolling claim.
6
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psychotic medication, or that he was unable to file a petition when not on this
medication. Brown fails to assert why or how his particular mental challenges
prevented him from timely filing his petition.
And the mere fact that a petitioner has mental challenges is not an
exception to the statute of limitations.

There is no mental incapacitation

exception. There is only a tolling provision. A petitioner is not exempt from
the statute of limitations merely because he has mental challenges. Rather, a
petitioner must prove that he is entitled to have the statute of limitations tolled
during the time period that he "was prevented from filing a petition ... due to
mental incapacity." Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-107(3) (e1nphasis added).

"The

petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence" that
he is entitled to relief under the tolling provision. Id. Brown has not met that
burden.
Indeed, Brown's own behavior demonsh·ated an ability to access the
courts and litigate claims. Brown filed multiple motions (such as a motion for
discovery and a motion for re-sentencing) in the underlying criminal case. He
does not explain how his alleged mental incapacity prevented him from filing a
timely post-conviction petition, but did not prevent him from filing other
pleadings in the criminal case.
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3. This Court should disregard Brown's unpreserved claims
because he does not justify appellate review under
established exceptions.

This Court should not consider Brown's unpreserved claims because he
does not argue any basis to excuse his preservation failure. Generally, "'claims
not raised before the h·ial court may not be raised on appeal." State v. Benson,
2014 UT App 92, iJ24, 325 P.3d 855 (quotations and citation omitted).

An

appellate court will address an unpreserved "issue only if (1) the appellant
establishes that the district court committed 'plain error,' (2) 'exceptional
circumstances' exist, or (3) in some situations, if the appellant raises a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve the issue." State v. Lou,,
2008 UT 58, if 19, 192 P.3d 867.
'"[E]xceptional circumstances' is a concept that is used sparingly,
properly reserved for truly exceptional situations" such as "rare procedural
anomalies."

State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996) (quotation and

citation omitted). No such circumstances exist here.
An appellant cannot adequately brief an unpreserved issue unless he
presents his argument "through the lens of one ... of these exceptions."

See

State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ,121, 167 P.3d 1046; see also Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(5) (requiring an appellant, in his opening brief, to either demonstrate that
the issue was preserved or state an exception for considering the unpreserved
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issue).

An appellate court will not consider unpreserved issues when the

appellant articulates no justification for review. Brown does not argue through
the lens of any exception to the preservation rule. Therefore, this Court should
not review his unpreserved claims. See id.

,r 21.

In any event, Brown has not demonstrated that the post-conviction court
plainly erred by not tolling the one-year time limit. "To prevail under plain
error review, a defendant must demonstrate that '[1] an error exists; [2] the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and [3] the error is harmful,
i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome."' Low, 2008 UT 58, ir20 (quoting State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, if17, 174
P.3d 628).

The record shows no obvious, prejudicial error in the lower court's
conclusion that Brown had "not raised a colorable argument that he was
"prevented from filing a petition due to state action in violation of United States
Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity."' (R165). Since his claims
lack merit, he would not have been entitled to post-conviction relief even if his
petition had not been dismissed as untimely.
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II.
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED AUTHORITY TO
RECOGNIZE AN "EGREGIOUS INJUSTICE" EXCEPTION TO
AN UNTIMELY FILING

Brown argues that the district court erred in dismissing his petition
because the so-called "egregious injustice" exception could have been applied
as an exception to the PCRA (Aplt. Br. at 1).

But the district court lacked

authority to recognize an egregious injustice exception to an untimely filed
petition.
The Utah Supreme Court previously acknowledged the possibility of a
constitutionally-based "egregious injustice" exception to the PCRA' s procedural
limits, but it has yet to explicitly adopt such an exception (R210); Winward v.

State, 2012 UT 85, 293 P.3d 259. The post-conviction court did not apply any
"egregious injustice" exception.

This Court may affirm because only the

supreme court may create such an exception, which it has yet to do.
A. The district court could not have excused Brown's untimely
filing under a constitutionally-based "egregious injustice"
exception because the supreme court has yet to recognize that
such an exception exists or define when it would apply.

Under the present state of the law, the judiciary has constitutional
authority over post-conviction, post-appeal review of a criminal conviction. See
Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, ill 7, 94 P.3d 263 (stating "the power to review

post-conviction petitions '[q]uintessentially ... belongs to the judicial branch of
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government'") (quoting Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989)
(discussing the scope of the writ of habeas corpus in the Utah constitution)).
Relying on that precedent, the supreme court has reasoned that "'the legislature
may not impose resh·ictions which limit [post-conviction relief] as a judicial rule
of procedure, except as provided in the constitution."' Gardner, 2004 UT 42, ,I17
(citation omitted).
But the judicial branch's ownership does not inexorably give rise to a
constitutional exception to the PCRA's statutory time bar. To the contrary, the
supreme court, through its rule making authority, has determined that the
judiciary will exercise its constitutional power over post-conviction cases within
the confines of the PCRA.
In 2009, the supreme court amended rule 65C(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, to provide that the PCRA "sets forth the manner and extent to which
a person may challenge the validity of a criminal conviction and sentence after
the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal." Utah R.
Civ. P. 65C(a) (2010). The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 65C state that the
rule amendments "embrace Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act as the law
governing post-conviction relief." This direction required the district court to
consider the petition under the PCRA, and not any extra-statutory exceptions.
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In Gardner v. State, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that there may be
a circumstance where it would be an "egregious injustice" to deny a petitioner
relief even though his petition is untimely or otherwise procedurally barred.

See 2010 UT 46, il,193-94, 234 P.3d 1115. But Gardner also established that only
the Utah Supreme Court has the authority to recognize and establish extrastatutory exceptions to the PCRA's time and procedural bars.

The Gardner

court noted that while rule 65C "embrace[s]" the PCRA as governing postconviction relief, "this court retains constitutional authority, even when a
petition is procedurally barred, to determine whether denying relief would
result in an egregious injustice." Id. if 93 (emphasis added). The reference to
"this court" obviously refers to the Utah Supreme Court.
This limit dovetails with the supreme court's rule 65C amendment
requiring the district courts to apply the PCRA. The Utah Constitution gives
only the Utah Supreme Court the authority to "adopt rules of procedure and
evidence." UTAH CONST. Art. 8, § 4 ("The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of
procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule
manage the appellate process").
There is no corresponding provision conferring rule-making authority on
the district courts.

Because a district court must follow the Utah Supreme

Court's rules, the district court lacked authority to read into the PCRA an extra-
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statutory "egregious injustice" exception in contravention of a supreme court
rule requiring the courts to apply the PCRA.
And because only the supreme court has rule-making authority, only it
can suspend rule 65C' s requirement to follow the PCRA, and then recognize
and define an "egregious injustice" exception. See Gardner, 2010 UT 46,

if 93.

Because the supreme court has yet to decide that such an exception exists, the
district court could not apply the non-existent exception to excuse Brown's
untimely filing. This Court should affirm for that reason alone.
B.

Alternatively, Brown cannot satisfy the threshold for considering
whether an "egregious injustice" exists.

In Winward v. State, the supreme court defined the threshold a petitioner
must meet before that court would even consider whether to exercise its
constitutional authority over post-conviction review to recognize

any

"egregious injustice" exception to the PCRA' s procedural limits. A petitioner
must "demonstrate that he has a reasonable justification for 1nissing the
deadline combined with a meritorious defense." Winward, 2012 UT 85,

,r

18.

And the petitioner bears the "heavy burden" of demonstrating that his case
presents such significant issues that the supre1ne court should address its
constitutional authority to consider such an exception. Id. Brown cannot satisfy
that threshold.
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1. Brown provided no reasonable justification for the late filing
that would warrant considering whether to recognize an
extra-statutory exception.

Brown asserts that that he is mentally ill and that he was not on
antipsychotic medication until 2013. But these assertions do not warrant an
extra-statutory exception because the PCRA already accounts for them.

As

addressed above, the PCRA tolls the one-year time limit for any period during
which a petitioner was unable to access the courts due to mental or physical
incapacity. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(3). There is no reason to create an
extra-statutory exception for a contingency the statute already covers.
2. Brown cannot establish that his claims could meet the
meritoriousness threshold to justify considering whether an
egregious injustice exception exists.

Brown

also

meritoriousness.

cannot

prove

the

second

threshold

element

of

A '" petitioner bears the burden of pointing to sufficient

factual evidence or legal authority to support a conclusion of meritoriousness."'
Winward, 2012 UT 85, ~20 (citing Adams, 2005 UT 62, if 20). "This means that the

petition must have 'an arguable basis in fact,' which would 'support a claiin for
relief as a matter of law."' Id. (citing Adams, 2005 UT 62, ~19). Brown has failed
to establish that his claims are meritorious.
threshold requirement.
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He therefore cannot meet this

III.
BROWN'S ASSERTIONS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL DO NOT ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR RELIEF

On appeal, Brown claims that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel.

Brown raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for three

purposes:
(1)

He asserts that his petition should not have been dismissed as

untimely because he received ineffective assistance of counsel;
(2)

He argues that an egregious injustice occurred based on his claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel; and
(3)

He raises his underlying claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

without addressing the timeliness issue.
Brown is not entitled to appellate relief on any theory of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
A.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not establish a
basis to proceed with an untimely petition.

Brown argues that he was justified in failing to meet the one-year statute
of limitations because he received ineffective assistance of counsel (Aplt. Br. at
3).

But recent case law confirms that merely alleging that counsel was

ineffective is not a reasonable justification for missing the PCRA' s time
limitation.

Williams v. State, 2015 UT App 271, ~3, _

P.3d _

(stating

argument "that ineffective assistance of counsel should have tolled the statute
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of limitations is unpersuasive because 'the mere allegation that counsel was
ineffective is not a reasonable justification for missing the PCRA' s time
limitations."' (quotations and citation omitted)).
B.

Brown's ineffective assistance claims do not establish
entitlement to an egregious injustice exception to the statute of
limitations.

Brown argues that his counsel's "conduct was nothing short of egregious
misconduct when he agreed to pay for an out of state transfer if he, appellant,
were to accept a plea." (Aplt. Br. at 2). Brown has failed to establish that there
was any 1nisconduct (see footnote 5, above).

But even if there were, as

discussed, the district court lacked authority to recognize an egregious injustice
exception to an untimely filing.
C.

The district court properly declined to address the merits of
Brown's ineffective assistance claims because they were
untimely.

On appeal, Brown asserts that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel (Aplt. Br. at 6). But the district court did not address the merits of this
claim, and Brown does not allege or demonstrate error in that refusal.
The district court properly declined to address the underlying merits of
the claims because they were untimely. Because the court determined that the
petition was untimely, it was not required to decide or even to comment on the
merits of the underlying claims. In fact, rule 65C provides that the court must

-21-

first determine whether a claim is precluded as untimely before commenting on
the merits. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(b) (stating "if the court comments on the merits
of a post-conviction claim, it shall first clearly and expressly determine whether
that claim is independently precluded under Section 78B-9-106").
Brown's untimely ineffective assistance claims do not provide any basis
for appellate relief.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
At the conclusion of his brief, Brown requests that he be allowed to
withdraw his plea. Even if successful on appeal, Brown would not be entitled
to the relief he requests. The matter on appeal is the dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief.

The dismissal should be affirmed.

But even if the

dismissal were reversed, the available relief would be a remand to the postconviction court for the post-conviction case to proceed to the merits.
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Respectfully submitted on December 17, 2015.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General

Assistant Attorney Gener
Counsel for Appellee

..... _.......
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on December 17, 2015, two copies of the Brief of Appellee
were ~ mailed

•

hand-delivered to:

Jack Daniel Brown, #129334
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
Also, in accordance with Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No. 8, a
courtesy brief on CD in searchable portable document format (pdf):

~ was filed with the Court and served on appellant.

•

will be filed and served within 14 days.
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Addendum A

§ 788-9-106. Preclusion of relief--Exception, UT ST§ 788-9-106

!West's Utah Code Annotated
ITitle 78b. Judicial Code
IChapter 9. Postconviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
IPart 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-106
Formerly cited as UT ST§ 78-35a-106
§ 78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief--Exception
Currentness

~

(I) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:

(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
~

(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a
previous request for post-conviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107.
(2)(a) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, including during the state's appeal from an order
granting post-conviction relief, unless the court determines that the state should have raised the time bar or procedural bar at
an earlier time.
(b) Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, provided that it gives the parties notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was
not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
(4) This section authorizes a merits review only to the extent required to address the exception set forth in Subsection (3).
Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1170. eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 5, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2010, c. 48, § I, eff. May 11,
2010.
Notes of Decisions containing your search terms (0)
View all 89

U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-106, UT ST§ 78B-9-106
Current through 2015 First Special Session

·.. ·., ::-·. Next

§ 788-9-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief, UT ST§ 788-9-107

u

!West's Utah Code Annotated
ITitle 78b. Judicial Code
IChapter 9. Postconviction Remedies Act (Refs & An nos)
IPart 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-107
Formerly cited as UT ST§ 78-35a-107
§ 78B-9-107. Statute oflimitations for postconviction relief
Currentness

(I) A petitioner is entitled to reliefonly if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is taken;

U

(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, if
no petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition for certiorari
review, ifa petition for writ of certiorari is filed;

u)

(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, ofevidentiary facts on
which the petition is based; or
(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104( I )(f) is established.

(3) The limitations period is tolled for any period during which the petitioner was prevented from filing a petition due to state
action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity. The petitioner has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is entitled to relief under this Subsection (3).
(4) The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the outcome ofa petition asserting:
(a) exoneration through DNA testing under Section 788-9-303; or
.)

(b) factual innocence under Section 788-9-40 I.
(5) Sections 77-19-8, 788-2-104, and 788-2-111 do not extend the limitations period established in this section.
Credits

J

Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1171, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008. c. 288, § 6, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 358, § I, ef[ May 5,
2008.
Notes of Decisions containing your search terms (0)
View all 68

ii

U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-107, UT ST§ 78B-9-107
Current through 2015 First Special Session
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACK DANIEL BROWN,
Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
ON MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

vs.
Case No. 13050433
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Judge G. Michael Westfall

Before the Court is the State's motion to dismiss Mr. Brown's petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner did not respond to the State's motion, though the Court, through
Judge James L. Shumate, granted him additional time to address the issue of timeliness under
Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies ~ct (PCRA), Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-101 et seq.
The Court has reviewed the motion, memorandum, and petition pursuant to the PCRA
~

and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). The PCRA requires a post-conviction petition to be
"filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued." Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-107(1).
Plainly, the petition was not filed within one year of when the cause of action accrued, and
Petitioner has not raised a colorable argument that he was "prevented from filing a petition due to
state action in violation of United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity."
Id. at (3).

The State's motion is therefore GRANTED and the petition is therefore DISMISSED.
DATED this

/f-'

day of June, 2014.

2
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CERTIFICATE OF N.I.AILING/DELIVERY

I hereby certify that on this

115t" day of

~

, 2014, I provided a true

and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF to each of the
parties/attorneys nained below by placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at
the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in the United States
Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Jack Daniel Brown, #129334
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box250
Draper, Utah 84020
Erin Riley
Office of the Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACK DANIEL BROWN,
Petitioner,

AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,

e

Case No. 13050~33

Respondent.
Judge G. Michael Westfall

Before the Court is the State's motion to dismiss Mr. Brown's petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner did not respond to the State's motion, though the Court. through
Judge James L. Shumate, granted him additional time to address the issue of timeliness under
Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-101 et seq.
The Court has reviewed the motion, memorandum, and petition pursuant to the PCRA
and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). The PCRA requires a post-conviction petition to be
"filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued." Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-107(1).
Plainly, the petition was not filed within one year of when the cause of action accrued, and
Petitioner has not raised a colorable argument that he was "prevented from filing a petition due to
state action in violation of United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity.··
Id. at (3).

The State's motion is therefore GRANTED and the petition is therefore DISMISSED.
Although the court anticipated that there would be no question as to whether this was intended to
be a final order, considering the unequivocal content of the Order. in light of the Order of

Summary Dismissal, recently issued by the Utah Court of Appeals, in Case No. 20140631-CA,
relying on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 201 P.3d
966 (Utah 2009), the court grants the pending motions 1 to designate this Order as a final order
and hereby Orders, Adjudges and Decrees that ..no additional order is necessary."
DATED this 5th day of February, 2015.

Although Respondent had filed a Motion Asking the Court to Specifically Designate its
Memorandum Decision and Order as a Final Order on September 30, 2014, neither party filed a
request to submit that Motion for decision until after the Court of Appeals had issued its Order of
Summary Dismissal, and the Motion was, therefore, not submitted for decision by the court (See
Rule 7(d) URCP) until January 20, 2015. Petitioner filed a similar Motion and, although prior to
having given Respondent an opportunity to respond. also filed a Request to Submit for Decision
on January 30, 2015.
1

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY

I hereby certify that on this
(@

Jij__ day of

re 0.

, 2015, I provided a true

and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
ON MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF to each of the
parties/attorneys named below by placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at
the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in the United States
Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Jack Daniel Brown, #129334

Utah State Prison
P.O. Box250
Draper, Utah 84020
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Erin Riley -Office of the Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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Michael D. Esplin
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DELIVERY VIA U.S. MAIL
May 28, 2009
Jack Brown
Inmate Number #27939
Inmate Housing U2-214
Utah State Prison
P.O. box250
Draper, Utah 84020-0250

· -Re: Transfer
•

'it •

•

,.

. f •.

Dear Jack,

.:-:•,r.r

I certainly remember our conversation about your wanting a transfer. I also remember
that both Mary and I advised-you that. being• able to be transferred was not a condition of your.
plea, and that you should make the decision based upon the other considerations such as strength
of the state's case, likelihood of being able to g~t a better result from a jury, and being able to be
assured of getting the death penalty off the table. I recall that your decision was based on those
factors, not the possibility of getting a transfer·.
However, I do know that getting a transfer was important to you. I did indicate that I
would be willing to assist you financially in paying the transfer fee. I am still willing to do that
(although the amount you initially indicated was-~upposed to be around $2,000.00 as opposed the
$3,800.00 it apparently now will cost). I have been in touch with the transportation division to
arrange the payment. I wanted to talk with Anne Hobbs, who is the person in charge of transfers
and who was the person I talked with ini1;i?fly to see if an L WOP prisoner could be eligible for a
compassionate transfer. I w~ not'
to'·talk ~th her and the information I received caused me
some concern. The reason is that tb.ei~oney needs to be in place before the transfer people even
send the request to Nevada. Iffor·some reason Nevada declines to accept the transfer, the :funds
are not returned to the person who posted them. Also, the reason the cost is so high to transfer a
prisoner from here to Nevada is ~t the cost includes a return trip so that if the prisoner gets to
Nevada and then decides -~e doesn't like it there, ~ere are funds there to finance the return trip,

~l!{e

..

'

JackBrown
May 28, 2009
Page2

so that's where the difference between the approx. $2,000.00 you originally thought the cost to
be and the approx. $4,000.00 that they want up front. Since you are on an LWOP sentence if
you stay in Nevada for the duration of the sentence, the money for the transfer back is never ~ed
or returned.
So this is where I have a problem. I am certainly willing to put up the whole amount if in
fact your transfer goes through. However, I have reservations about paying the funds in and then
having Nevada refuse to accept your transfer. In that case, I would be out the money and you
would still be at the USP.
I was able to contact Anne Hobbs recently .to see if there is a way I can post the money
and then·if tb:e transfer 'doesn't go through get th~ money refunded. She has indicated ta me that
she has discussed this situation with the new deputy warden because she has concerns about the
current system since it results in those who would finance transfers (in most cases family
members) being reluctant to do so. The deputy warden has been out of town but will be back
next Monday. She has promised to bring the issue up to see if there is a way to either change the
procedure or to axrange for me to guarantee payment upon acceptance by Nevad~ Hopefully,
the issue will be resolved and you can be on your way. I have the funds ready as soon as th.ere is
a procedure in place.
Sincerely,

ESPLIN

I WEIGHT,

Attorneys at La.=__.._,...

Cc:

